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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Appellate Division of the Virgin Islands vacated 
Charles Walker's sentence and reversed his convictions 
after a jury found him guilty on all five counts of an 
indictment charging him with credit card fraud and 
possession of stolen property. The Government of the Virgin 
Islands appeals. For the reasons set forth herein, we will 
reverse in part and affirm in part. 
 
I. 
 
Briefly stated, the circumstances leading to Walker's 
arrest and conviction are as follows:1  
 
Walker arrived in the Virgin Islands from his home in 
Atlanta, Georgia on November 5, 1996 with another man, 
Earl Gunn. While in the Virgin Islands, the men purchased 
approximately $16,889 worth of jewelry with fraudulent 
credit cards. The day after the purchases, police 
apprehended Walker and Gunn at the airport after a 
customs official there discovered nine credit cards bearing 
different names in Walker's carry-on-luggage during a 
routine search. Walker and Gunn were thereafter charged 
with credit card fraud and possession of stolen property. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Inasmuch as a detailed recitation of the facts can be found in the 
opinion of the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, see Walker v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 124 F. Supp.2d 
933 (D.V.I., 2000), we need only reiterate those facts to the extent they 
may be helpful to our brief discussion. 
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Gunn subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of credit 
card fraud. Walker proceeded to trial where he testified in 
his own defense. He admitted committing the acts that gave 
rise to the charges against him. However, he claimed that 
he acted under duress. According to his testimony, a group 
of unknown men had threatened to harm his daughter if he 
did not fly to the Virgin Islands, pick up a Rolex watch and 
bracelet, fly back to Atlanta, and deliver the goods. 
Although the jurors may have been amused by Walker's 
testimony, they were not persuaded by it. The jury was 
apparently more impressed by the proof of Walker's guilt 
than by his credibility. He was convicted on all counts. 
 
He thereafter appealed to the Appellate Division of the 
Virgin Islands which reversed the convictions and sentence. 
The Government of the Virgin Islands now appeals that 
reversal to us. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.S 3731, 
and 48 U.S.C. S 1613. See Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Charleswell, 24 F.3d 571, 574-75 (3d Cir. 1994). We review 
the sentence that was imposed for abuse of discretion 
inasmuch as it did not exceed the statutory limits of the 
applicable statute. United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78 (3d 
Cir. 1993). We exercise plenary review over the district 
court's determination of questions of law. United States v. 
Bennett, 100 F.3d 1105, 1108 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
II. 
 
Walker was convicted of two counts of violating 14 V.I.C. 
S 2101(a), possession of stolen property (Counts III and V), 
and three counts of violating 14 V.I.C. S 3004, credit card 
fraud (Counts I, II, and IV). The Appellate Division found 14 
V.I.C. SS 3004 and 3010, the respective Credit Card Crimes 
Act ("CCCA") charging and penalty provisions, to be 
inconsistent with 14 V.I.C. S 2101. The Appellate Division 
reasoned that the "[t]wo provisions are `inconsistent' if they 
are `mutually repugnant or contradictory,' that is, if the 
`establishment of one implies the abrogation of the other.' " 
Walker, 124 F. Supp.2d at 941 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
766 (6th ed. 1991)). The court found an inconsistency with 
respect to the specific manner in which each statute 
determines the value of the property received. The court 
noted that while "the CCCA aggregates the total value of 
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property and services received within a six-month period 
into a single offense" and is accompanied by a more lenient 
maximum penalty, section 2101 "defines each instance of 
buying, receiving, or possessing stolen property during that 
same six-month period as a separate offense" punishable 
by a significantly harsher maximum penalty. In 
determining that the CCCA imposed a limit on the number 
of convictions that can be obtained under the statute, the 
Appellate Division dismissed our language in Gov't of Virgin 
Islands v. Graves, 593 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1979), to the 
contrary, as "pure dictum." In Graves, we stated that 
"Nothing in our construction of section 3004 precludes the 
government from prosecuting each separate violation of 
section 3004 and obtaining multiple convictions based on 
proof of each separate use." Graves, 593 F.2d at 223, n. 11. 
 
The Appellate Division thus concluded that Walker's 
credit card offense could be charged only as an offense 
under the CCCA. However, the Appellate Division then 
determined that "the Government [had] confessed error in 
that, inter alia, it failed to charge and prove an essential 
element of [14 V.I.C. S 3004] to wit: Walker's intent to 
defraud." Walker, 124 F. Supp.2d at 942. The court 
therefore vacated his convictions on counts I, II, and IV, the 
counts that charged a violation of section 3004. 
 
III. 
 
The Government argues that the Appellate Division erred 
in two respects: (1) it incorrectly ruled that Walker could be 
charged and convicted under only the CCCA; and (2) it 
ruled that there is a limit on the number of convictions that 
can be obtained under the CCCA. We agree with the 
government on both points. 
 
The Appellate Division concluded that the CCCA is the 
exclusive statute governing credit card offenses, so that 
Walker was improperly charged under the more general 
statute that criminalizes the possession of stolen property 
as well. However, this view of the scope of the CCCA is 
directly contrary to the clear language of the CCCA. Section 
3014 of the CCCA reads: 
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       This chapter (sections 3001-16) shall not be construed 
       to preclude the applicability of any other provision of 
       the criminal law of the Virgin islands which presently 
       applies or may in the future apply to any transaction 
       which violates this chapter, unless such provision is 
       inconsistent with the terms of this chapter. 
 
14 V.I.C. S 3014. In the face of this language, we cannot 
conclude that the Legislature intended to make the CCCA 
exclusive. 
 
The only issue, then, is whether the stolen property 
statute is "inconsistent with the terms" of the CCCA. The 
Appellate Division found the statutes to be inconsistent 
based upon the charging and penalty provisions of the two 
statutes. It viewed section 3004 as limiting a court to 
imposing a single penalty for the sum of all acts described 
thereunder occurring within a six-month period. Section 
2101, on the other hand, allows separate penalties for each 
act of buying, receiving, or possessing stolen property. 
Accordingly, it reasoned, the penalty provisions of the two 
statutes are inconsistent. However, we do not believe that 
because the provisions of the two statutes are different, 
they are necessarily inconsistent. Rather, inconsistency 
means that they cannot coexist or be reconciled. Here, 
there is nothing inconsistent between the two crimes, and 
neither one allows conduct that is barred by the other or 
bars conduct that is allowed by the other. We cannot 
conclude that the provisions of the two statutes are 
"inconsistent" merely because they treat instances of crime 
and punishment in different ways, with different policies 
underlying each criminal provision. 
 
The Appellate Division's reasoning regarding 
inconsistency depends in some measure on its reading of 
our opinion in Graves. The Appellate Division "held" that 
section 3004's six-month limitation was a charging 
provision that defines the crime. Because section 3004 
limits the charging in this fashion, while section 2101 
allows separate penalties for each act of buying, receiving 
or possessing stolen property, the Appellate Division 
concluded that the statutes were inconsistent. However, we 
note that in Graves, we reasoned to the contrary and -- 
notwithstanding the Appellate Division's view -- concluded 
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that the Government could prosecute each separate 
violation of section 3004 and obtain multiple convictions 
based on proof of each separate use. Thus, Graves 
seriously undermines the Appellate Division's reasoning as 
to how section 3004 should be interpreted and, accordingly, 
lends little support for the "inconsistency" that it found. 
 
Therefore, we reject the analysis of the Appellate Division 
with respect to the exclusivity of the CCCA and the way the 
provisions are to be interpreted, and we hold that section 
3004 of the CCCA is not inconsistent with section 2101(a). 
 
Accordingly, because we conclude that Walker could be 
charged with violations of both statutes, we will reverse the 
District Court's "voiding" of Walker's convictions on Counts 
III and V, charging possession of stolen property. However 
we will not reinstate his convictions for violating section 
3004, because in its reply brief the Government stated: 
 
       The Government has confessed that, applying the 
       Blockburger test to the specific facts of this case as 
       charged, the defendant could not be sentenced for the 
       three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card in 
       addition to the two counts of possession of stolen 
       property. Therefore, the Government has agreed that 
       on remand, it will move to vacate and dismiss the three 
       credit card counts, pursuant to the procedure set forth 
       in Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985) (citation 
       omitted). 
 
Reply Br. at 4. Given this concession, we will not reinstate 
the convictions for violating section 3004 set forth in the 
remaining counts. 
 
IV. 
 
The Government also argues that the Appellate Division 
erred in vacating Walker's sentence. The Appellate Division 
vacated the sentence because it concluded that the trial 
judge punished Walker for exercising his constitutional 
right to proceed to trial and thereby denied him his Fifth 
Amendment right to due process of law. Walker, a first- 
time, nonviolent offender, received the maximum 23 years 
in prison after he was convicted of these offenses. 
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The record of the pretrial conference reveals that the trial 
judge inappropriately injected himself into the plea 
negotiations to the extent of reformulating the offer that the 
Government made to Walker and his co-defendant, Gunn. 
Even though the Government had offered both defendants 
a "deal," the trial judge announced: 
 
       If one plea and he wants some consideration to testify 
       and go for broke against the other, I will. Whoever 
       wants to plea and take the two years, credit for time 
       served and suspended sentence provided he testify 
       against the other person, yeah, I would go with that. I 
       would go with that. Whoever wants to plea and testify 
       against the other one, I would go with that. 
 
App. at 90. The following exchange occurred when defense 
counsel tried to remind the court that the Government's 
offer extended to both defendants: 
 
       Defense: But the plea was offered to both, Your 
       Honor. 
 
       The Court: But I'm not going to accept the plea for 
       both. I'll accept the plea for one and on 
       the condition that the other one testify 
       against the other. If not, then the two of 
       them go for broke and call it that. I have 
       no problems with that. 
 
       Defense: But in actuality, you're only saying one 
       person can accept the deal that the 
       Government offers? 
 
       The Court: Because whoever comes in first gets the 
       deal. 
 
       Gov't: But there's nothing barring the 
       Government from making a second offer, 
       maybe not as sweet but -- 
 
       The Court: Well, I know it can't be too sweet the 
       second time around. 
 
       Gov't: I understand that, but the Government-- 
       if the Government would make that offer. 
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       The Court: Whoever comes in first that's it. If they 
       don't come in then we go to trial, go for 
       broke. 
 
Id. at 94-96. This intrusion into the plea negotiations would 
be sufficient by itself to raise serious issues about the 
propriety of the trial court's actions and the impact of the 
court's "activism" on Walker's Fifth Amendment rights. 
However, the trial court did not stop there. Gunn accepted 
the Government's offer, and Walker was present during his 
change of plea proceeding. During that proceeding the trial 
court appeared to become irritated when defense counsel 
argued for a lower fine for Gunn. 
 
       The Court: I might want to scuttlebutt the deal. I 
       might want to reject the plea offer and go 
       for broke with the big 12. 
 
       Counsel: No, no, sir. I would concede 1,500 
       [dollars] is in order. 
 
       The Court: The big 12 would be ready October 31st if 
       Mr. Gunn wants to take a chance with 
       the big 12. Ask him if he wants to take a 
       chance with the big 12 and go for broke 
       for everything. 
 
       Counsel: We already discussed that. He said, no. 
 
       The Court: He's facing 30 something years. If he's 
       going for broke, that's fine with me. 
 
Id. at 129. The court finally accepted Gunn's plea of guilty 
to violating 14 V.I.C. S 3004, and sentenced him to time 
served and a $1500 fine. The judge then told Gunn, in 
Walker's presence, that Gunn was "very lucky," and that 
his attorney could tell him that "had you gone to trial on 
this, no way you were going to get this kind of sentence." 
Id. at 142. After Walker exercised his right to a jury trial 
and was convicted, the court reminded him that he had 
been offered a "sweety deedie plea," but failed to accept it. 
App. at 507. 
 
After a careful examination of the record, we conclude 
that the Appellate Division correctly determined that the 
sentencing court sentenced Walker to the maximum of two 
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consecutive ten-year terms, followed by three concurrent 
three-year terms and a fine of $13,000, primarily because 
Walker exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. As 
the Appellate Division stated: "[t]he harsh sentence imposed 
on Walker violated his due process right to a fair 
sentencing procedure, because the sentence constituted 
punishment for his assertion of his right to a trial." Walker, 
124 F. Supp.2d at 943. 
 
A sentencing court can, of course, reject the results of a 
plea negotiation if it concludes that the resulting agreement 
is not in the best interest of justice. Here, however, the trial 
court's actions exceeded all conceivable limitations of 
propriety. As the Appellate Division correctly observed, the 
trial court's involvement merged into the "prosecutorial 
function properly left to the executive branch." Walker, 124 
F. Supp.2d at 938. "Even the appearance of siding with the 
government to dissuade a defendant from asserting his 
constitutional right to a trial is prohibited." Id., citing United 
States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1973) 
("[C]ourts must not use the sentencing power as a carrot 
and stick to clear congested calendars, and they must not 
create an appearance of such a practice."). In Longval v. 
Meachum, 651 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1981), the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit stated: "[a] judge who 
participates in plea bargaining `is no longer a judicial officer 
or a neutral arbiter. Rather, he becomes or seems to 
become an advocate for the resolution he has suggested to 
the defendant.' " Id. at 821. After reviewing this record, the 
Appellate Division concluded that: 
 
       [t]he extreme disparity of sentences imposed on Walker 
       and Gunn, the harshness of Walker's sentence for a 
       first-time, nonviolent offense, the judge's implicit 
       threats and coercive involvement in plea negotiations, 
       . . . all raise the inference that [the trial judge] gave 
       undue consideration to Walker's refusal to plead guilty, 
       and that his insistence on a jury trial impermissibly 
       influenced [the trial judge's] imposition of the 
       maximum sentence of twenty-three years. Such abuse 
       of discretion, regardless of what other, legitimate 
       factors the judge may have considered in sentencing 
       Walker, was constitutional error. 
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Walker 124 F. Supp.2d at 938. We agree. Accordingly, the 
defendant is entitled to resentencing for the convictions 
that we reinstate. 
 
V. 
 
Walker asks that we assign this matter to a different 
judge upon remand. Although "[i]t is the standard practice 
in the district courts and in this circuit that a case on 
remand is assigned to the judge who originally heard it," we 
can, in the exercise of our supervisory power, reassign this 
case to a different judge upon remand. United States v. 
Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1043 n.30 (3d Cir. 1982). Although 
we have not formulated a specific test for determining when 
reassignment to a different judge is in order, in Alexander 
v. Primerica Holdings, 10 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
stated: 
 
       impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in a 
       judicial officer are the sine quo non of the American 
       legal system. Because justice must satisfy the 
       appearance of justice, it is our responsibility to exercise 
       our supervisory authority, as reluctant as we always 
       are to do so when it requires the reassignment of a 
       case . . . . We must preserve not only the reality but 
       also the appearance of the proper functioning of the 
       judiciary as a neutral, impartial administrator of 
       justice. 
 
Id. at 167 (internal citations, quotations omitted). Inasmuch 
as the aforementioned conduct and comments of the trial 
judge here make it exceedingly difficult to resurrect an 
appearance of impartiality without remand to a different 
sentencing judge, we conclude that Walker's request for 
reassignment must be granted. 
 
VI. 
 
In his brief to the Appellate Division, Walker raised, inter 
alia, additional arguments including his assertion that the 
trial court erred by placing the burden of proving duress on 
him rather than on the Government. The Government did 
not respond to these issues and the Appellate Division did 
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not reach them, as it based its reversal of the Territorial 
Court on the Government's confession of error as to Counts 
I, II, and IV. Inasmuch as the Appellate Division has not 
ruled on these additional grounds for relief, we will not now 
address them in the first instance. See Charleswell, 24 F.3d 
at 573 ("The arguments that [defendant] raises in his cross- 
appeal were . . . not addressed by [the Appellate Division], 
and we decline to address these arguments in the first 
instance. Instead, we will remand so that they can be 
decided initially by the Appellate Division."). Accordingly, 
we will remand to that court so that it may consider 
Walker's remaining arguments. 
 
VII. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the June 5, 2000 
decision of the Appellate Division is reversed insofar as it 
vacated Walker's convictions for violating 14 V.I.C.S 2101, 
possession of stolen property. In all other respects, that 
order of the Appellate Division will be affirmed. As 
explained above, we will remand this case to the Appellate 
Division for further proceedings. If the Appellate Division 
should rule against the defendant, that court shall remand 
Walker's case to the Territorial Court with instructions that 
the case be assigned to a different judge for resentencing. 
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